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JURY INSTRUCTIONS ON EYEWITNESS
IDENTIFICATION EVIDENCE:
A RE-EVALUATION
FIONA LEVERICK†
Abstract:  The primary contribution of this paper is to challenge
the accepted wisdom that jury instructions are an ineffective safeguard
against wrongful conviction caused by mistaken eyewitness identifica-
tion.  It argues that such a conclusion is based on an erroneous inter-
pretation of the available experimental evidence and that, in fact, there
are grounds for optimism about the effectiveness of jury instructions in
educating jurors about the risks posed by eyewitness identification evi-
dence and sensitising them to the factors relevant to its evaluation.  In
order to play a useful role in safeguarding against wrongful conviction,
however, instructions need to be easily comprehensible; to reflect the
relevant scientific findings; and be provided to jurors in writing (or an
alternative format for those who would find written instructions inac-
cessible).  The paper also makes a secondary contribution, which is to
warn of the dangers of accepting uncritically the findings of mock jury
research as the basis for legal policy formation.
I. INTRODUCTION
It can scarcely be debated these days that mistaken eyewitness
identification evidence is one of the major causes—if not the major
cause—of wrongful conviction.1  Indeed, the debate has long moved on
to focus on the merits of various safeguards that might be put in place
to minimize the risk of wrongful conviction occurring.  These have in-
cluded measures targeting the police investigation and the conduct of
suspect-identification procedures,2 as well as measures aimed at regu-
lating the use of eyewitness identification evidence at trial, such as
† The research on which this article is based was financially supported by the
Scottish Government as part of Lord Bonomy’s Post-Corroboration Safeguards Review,
a review of safeguards against wrongful conviction following the abolition of the re-
quirement for corroboration in Scottish criminal law. See Post-Corroboration Safe-
guards Review: Report of the Academic Expert Group (James Chalmers, Fiona Leverick
& Alasdair Shaw, eds., 2014).  The author would like to express thanks to Alasdair
Shaw, who provided invaluable research assistance, the other members of the project
team (James Chalmers, Fraser Davidson, Peter Duff, Pamela Ferguson and Findlay
Stark) and James Chalmers in particular for helpful feedback on an earlier draft of this
article.
1. See infra notes 8-27 and accompanying text.
2. See infra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
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exclusionary powers,3 expert testimony,4 and instructions that alert
jurors to the risks associated with eyewitness identification evidence.5
It is the last of these that is the concern of this Article.  Jury in-
structions have come to be dismissed by many commentators as an
inadequate safeguard against wrongful conviction resulting from mis-
taken eyewitness identification.  As Dufraimont puts it, “a level of
scholarly consensus has developed around the notion that jury in-
structions on eyewitness identification are basically ineffective.”6
This Article re-evaluates that claim and argues that those who have
dismissed jury instructions as an ineffective safeguard have done so
too hastily, as the evidence available from the relevant studies does
not lead to that conclusion at all.  That is not to say that jury instruc-
tions provide a complete solution to the problem of wrongful conviction
based on mistaken eyewitness identification evidence; clearly they do
not.7  The claim made in this Article is that, contrary to the accepted
view, there are grounds for optimism about the effectiveness of in-
structions in helping jurors to evaluate eyewitness testimony appro-
priately.  Indeed, there may even be grounds for some degree of
confidence.
As such, the Article proceeds as follows.  Part II establishes eye-
witness misidentification evidence as a leading cause of wrongful con-
viction.  Part III sets out exactly why it is such a problematic form of
evidence.  Part IV outlines the various safeguards that might be uti-
lized to reduce the risk of wrongful conviction caused by mistaken eye-
witness identification evidence.  Part V considers in detail the
available experimental evidence on the effectiveness of jury instruc-
tions.  It concludes that the studies have generally been misinter-
preted to suggest that jury instructions are an ineffective safeguard
against wrongful conviction but that a careful reading of the studies
does not support this conclusion at all.  As such, jury instructions may
have a more useful role to play than has hitherto been attributed to
them.  Part VI considers how the effectiveness of jury instructions on
eyewitness identification evidence might be maximized.  Part VII of-
fers some concluding remarks.
3. See infra note 53 and accompanying text.
4. See infra note 54 and accompanying text.
5. See infra note 55 and accompanying text.
6. Lisa D. Dufraimont, Regulating Unreliable Evidence: Can Evidence Rules
Guide Juries and Prevent Wrongful Convictions?, 33 QUEEN’S L.J. 261, 301 (2008); See
also infra notes 65-69 and accompanying text.
7. It should be said at the outset that jury instructions can only act as a safeguard
in trials involving a jury.  The safeguards appropriate to bench trials lie beyond the
scope of this Article.
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II. EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION EVIDENCE AS A CAUSE
OF WRONGFUL CONVICTION
It has long been recognized that mistaken eyewitness identifica-
tion is one of the leading causes of wrongful conviction.8  It was one of
the causes identified by Borchard’s pioneering study of wrongful con-
viction in 1932,9 and has consistently been identified as the leading
cause (or one of the leading causes) in studies ever since.10  The most
significant of these are the research projects based on the datasets
held by the Innocence Project,11 (founded in 1992 and based at Car-
dozo Law School12) and the National Registry of Exonerations
(NRE)13 (a joint project of the University of Michigan School of Law
and the Center on Wrongful Convictions at Northwestern University
School of Law), both of which are based primarily or exclusively on
DNA-based exonerations.
The Innocence Project focuses purely on DNA-based exoneration
and, at the time of writing, had identified 330 such cases.14  Garrett
analyzed the first 250 of these,15 and found that eyewitness evidence
8. Wrongful conviction is used here to mean the conviction of those who are (in all
likelihood) factually innocent.  Convictions might be quashed for reasons other than a
belief that the appellant is factually innocent, such as a procedural irregularity that
casts doubt on the integrity of the criminal justice process.  It should also be said that in
many cases factual innocence is nearly impossible to establish with 100 percent cer-
tainty. See generally Keith A. Findley, Defining Innocence, 74 ALB. L. REV. 1157 (2010-
2011).
9. Edwin M. Borchard, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: ERRORS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
XX (Yale University Press 1932); see generally Marvin Zalman, WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS
AND MISCARRIAGES OF JUSTICE 329 (C. Ronald Huff & Martin Killias, eds., 2013).
10. See, e.g., JEROME FRANK & BARBARA FRANK, NOT GUILTY, 132-48 (Victor Gol-
lancz, 1st ed. 1957) (following a study of 36 cases of wrongful conviction); Edward D.
Radin, THE INNOCENTS (Morrow, 1964) (who identified single eyewitness identification
as a leading cause of 80 cases of wrongful conviction); Hugo Adam Bedau & Michael L.
Radelet, Miscarriages of Justice in Potentially Capital Cases, 40 STAN. L. REV. 21, 56
tbl. 6 (1987) (who examined 350 cases of wrongful conviction spanning 1900-1985 and
found mistaken eyewitness identification to be implicated in 56 of these); Arye Rattner,
Convicted but Innocent: Wrongful Conviction and the Criminal Justice System, 12 L. &
HUM. BEHAV. 283, 291 (1988) (noting that eyewitness misidentification was present in
100 cases in his study of 205 wrongful convictions).
11. THE INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/ (last visited Feb.
12, 2016).
12. See BARRY SCHECK, PETER NEUFELD & JIM DWYER, ACTUAL INNOCENCE: WHEN
JUSTICE GOES WRONG AND HOW TO MAKE IT RIGHT (2001) (giving a detailed account of
the history of the Innocence Project).
13. THE NATIONAL REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, https://www.law.umich.edu/special/
exoneration/Pages/browse.aspx (last visited Feb. 12, 2016).
14. THE INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/free-innocent/exon-
erating-the-innocent (last visited Oct. 6, 2015).
15. BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL PROSECU-
TIONS GO WRONG (2011) [hereinafter GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT].  A shorter
summary of his findings can be found in Brandon L. Garrett, Trial and Error, in
WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS AND MISCARRIAGES OF JUSTICE 77 (C. Ronald Huff & Martin
Killias, eds., 2013); Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 55
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had supported conviction in seventy-six percent of cases,16 making it
the leading contributory factor to wrongful conviction by far.17  The
NRE is a wider dataset because it does not limit itself to DNA-based
exoneration18 and, at the time of writing, contained 1,671 cases.19  A
research project examining the causes of the first 873 exonerations
(those registered from January 1989 to February 2012)20 reported
that mistaken eyewitness identification was a contributory factor in
forty-three percent of these.21  In fact, the figure is higher because,
unlike Garrett, the researchers attempted to distinguish between gen-
uine mistakes and deliberate misidentifications and classified the lat-
ter as perjury (which was a contributory factor in fifty-one percent of
cases in the sample).22  Including deliberate misidentifications in the
figures adds a further twenty-seven percent of cases to the total.23
The Innocence Project and the NRE focus on exonerations in the
United States, but these findings are not confined to the United States
context.  Mistaken eyewitness identification was “a major cause of
wrongful conviction” identified by the leading study of wrongful con-
viction in England and Wales.24  It has also been pinpointed as a lead-
(2008) (discussing the first 200 exonerations); see, e.g., Rory K. Little, Addressing the
Evidentiary Sources of Wrongful Convictions: Categorical Exclusion of Evidence in Capi-
tal Statutes, 37 SW. U. L. REV. 965 (2008) (providing additional analysis of the Inno-
cence Project data).  Brandon Garrett’s study is by far the most extensive.
16. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT, supra note 15, at 279.
17. Although it should perhaps be noted that Garrett’s analysis has been criticised
in the respect that merely identifying that a particular type of evidence was led in a
trial that resulted in a wrongful conviction does not tell us anything about the degree of
influence that this evidence had on the outcome. See SIMON A. COLE & WILLIAM C.
THOMPSON, WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS AND MISCARRIAGES OF JUSTICE 111 (C. Ronald Huff
& Martin Killias, eds., 2013).
18. SAMUEL R. GROSS & MICHAEL SHAFFER, EXONERATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES,
1989-2012: REPORT BY THE NATIONAL REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, 8 (2012).  This report
encompasses cases where pardons were granted or where criminal charges were dis-
missed at the prosecutor’s motion after new evidence of innocence emerged, acquittals
at retrials, a small number of “certificates of innocence” issued by courts and some pos-
thumous exonerations. Id.
19. THE NATIONAL REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, http://www.law.umich.edu/special/
exoneration/Pages/browse.aspx (last visited Oct. 6, 2015).
20. GROSS & SHAFFER, supra note 18, at 1.
21. Id. at 40 tbl. 13.
22. Id. at 50.
23. Id. at 52 tbl. 14.
24. RUTH BRANDON & CHRISTIE DAVIES, WRONGFUL IMPRISONMENT: MISTAKEN CON-
VICTIONS AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES, 24 (1973).
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ing cause of wrongful conviction in Canada,25 New Zealand,26 and in
continental European jurisdictions.27
III. WHY IS EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION EVIDENCE SO
PROBLEMATIC?
A vast amount of research into eyewitness memory has been un-
dertaken by psychologists,28 and its conclusions are encapsulated by
Wells et al., who state that eyewitness testimony is “among the least
reliable forms of evidence and yet is persuasive to juries.”29  Most re-
search studies have involved simulations (which vary according to the
degree to which they replicate reality),30 which does need to be borne
in mind when considering the validity of the findings.31  However,
eyewitness performance tends to deteriorate the more realistic the ex-
perimental conditions are.32  So, if anything, simulations may under-
estimate the extent of the problem.33
The psychological literature tells us that mistaken witnesses are
often confident when they give evidence at trial, but that such confi-
dence is not correlated with accuracy.34  This is worrying because
(perhaps unsurprisingly) mock jury studies35 have shown that jurors
place great weight on the degree of confidence that an eyewitness re-
25. FTP HEADS OF PROSECUTIONS SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE PREVENTION OF WRONG-
FUL CONVICTIONS, THE PATH TO JUSTICE: PREVENTING WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS 1-3
(2011).
26. THOMAS THORP, MISCARRIAGES OF JUSTICE 53 (2005).
27. Chrisje Brants, Tunnel Vision, Belief Perseverance and Bias Confirmation:
Only Human?, in WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS AND MISCARRIAGES OF JUSTICE 165-71 (C.
Ronald Huff & Martin Killias eds., 2013).
28. See BRIAN L. CUTLER & STEVEN D. PENROD, MISTAKEN IDENTIFICATION: THE
EYEWITNESS, PSYCHOLOGY AND THE LAW (1995) (discussing factors that influence eyewit-
ness accuracy such as perpetrator, event and post-event factors); Gary L. Wells et al.,
Eyewitness Identification Procedures: Recommendations for Lineups and Photospreads,
22 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 603, 627-36 (1998).
29. Wells et al., supra note 28, at 605.
30. Anne Maass, Logic and Methodology of Experimental Research in EYEWITNESS
PSYCHOLOGY, PSYCHOLOGICAL ISSUES IN EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION, 1996, at 279.  A
useful discussion of the various methods and their limitations can be found in Maass’
article. Id.
31. ANDREAS KAPARDIS, PSYCHOLOGY AND THE LAW: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 34-
38 (2014); CUTLER & PENROD, supra note 28, at 111-12.
32. CUTLER & PENROD, supra note 28, at 112.
33. Id.
34. Brian L. Cutler, Steven D. Penrod & Hedy Red Dexter, Juror Sensitivity to
Eyewitness Identification Evidence, 14 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 190 (1990); see also CUTLER &
PENROD, supra note 28, at 95 (reviewing relevant literature); Wells et al., supra note 28,
at 620-23.
35. On the utility of mock jury studies: see infra notes 71-84 and accompanying
text.
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ports when giving his or her testimony.36  In Garrett’s sample of
wrongful conviction caused by mistaken eyewitness testimony, the
(mistaken) witnesses were all confident at trial and this is likely to
have influenced the jury.37  In ninety-two of his 161 cases of mistaken
eyewitness identification (fifty-seven percent), however, the witnesses
reported they had been uncertain at an earlier stage.38  In thirty-four
of the 161 cases (twenty-one percent), the witnesses even admitted at
the trial that they had been uncertain earlier39 but even this clearly
did not persuade the juries concerned that the identification was mis-
taken.  Worryingly, almost all of the cases in Garrett’s sample in-
volved defendants who looked unlike the person the witnesses first
described as the perpetrator.40
There is research to suggest that extreme stress has a detrimen-
tal effect on the accuracy of eyewitness identification,41 although this
is still subject to some debate,42 due in part to the obvious difficulties
involved in research design.43  Similarly, the “weapon focus effect”
suggests that the presence of a weapon reduces the accuracy of identi-
fication.44  The vast majority of the 190 mistaken eyewitness identifi-
cation cases in Garrett’s sample (eighty-four percent) were “stranger
rapes” and he speculates that the “stress/weapon effect” might have
been a factor.45
The psychological literature also indicates that cross-racial identi-
fications are particularly problematic in terms of accuracy.46  As such,
36. Cutler, Penrod, & Dexter supra note 34; see also Kenneth A. Deffenbacher &
Elizabeth F. Loftus, Do Jurors Share a Common Understanding Concerning Eyewitness
Behavior?, 6 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 15 (1982) (noting their findings in relation to question 7
of the questionnaire they distributed to study participants).
37. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT, supra note 15, at 64.
38. Id. at 49.
39. Id. at 64.
40. Id. at 49.
41. See C.A. Morgan III et al., Accuracy of Eyewitness Memory for Persons Encoun-
tered During Exposure to High Intense Stress, 27 INT’L J. OF L. & PSYCHIATRY 265, 266
(2004) (describing extreme stress such as the stress that might be experienced by the
victim of a violent attack); Tim Valentine & Jan Mesout, Eyewitness Identification
Under Stress in the London Dungeon, 23 APP. COG. PSYCH. 151 (2009); see also CUTLER
& PENROD, supra note 28, at 103.
42. Sven-Ake Christianson, Emotional Stress and Eyewitness Memory: A Critical
Review, 112 PSYCHOL. BULL. 284 (1992); KAPARDIS, supra note 31, at 44-46.
43. Designing a realistic experiment that simulates the extreme stress of a violent
attack is difficult to do in a way that meets ethical standards.
44. Elizabeth F. Loftus, Geoffrey R. Loftus & Jane Messo, Some Facts About
‘Weapon Focus’, 11 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 55 (1987); Nancy M. Steblay, A Meta-Analytic
Review of the Weapon Focus Effect, 16 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 413 (1992); CUTLER & PENROD,
supra note 28, at 101; KAPARDIS, supra note 31, at 48-49.
45. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT, supra note 15, at 51.
46. Christian A. Meissner & John C. Brigham, Thirty Years of Investigating the
Own-Race Bias in Memory for Faces: A Meta-Analytic Review, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y &
L. 3 (2001); Roderick Lindsay & Gary L. Wells, What Do We Really Know About Cross-
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Garrett found that at least forty-nine percent of the exonerees mis-
identified by eyewitnesses involved a cross-racial identification.47
Gross and Shaffer found that more than two-thirds of mistaken eye-
witness identifications in sexual assault cases involved black defend-
ants and, of these, seventy-two percent (sixty-nine out of ninety-six)
involved an identification made by a white victim.48
IV. JURY INSTRUCTIONS AS A SAFEGUARD
The evidence presented in the preceding section leads to the con-
clusion that there is a need for at least some safeguards to operate
within the criminal justice system to prevent wrongful conviction
based on mistaken eyewitness identification.  Various safeguards
have been proposed, and they fall broadly into two categories: those
that target the investigation and those that target the trial.  During
the investigation, it is important that suspect identification proce-
dures are conducted in a manner that minimizes the risk of error; va-
rious guidelines have been developed in this respect.49  It has also
been suggested that individuals should not be subjected to a line-up
identification procedure at all unless there is at least a reasonable
suspicion (based on other evidence) that they committed the offense in
question.50  While not wishing to neglect the importance of measures
targeted at the investigatory stage, the primary focus of this article is
on measures that regulate the use of eyewitness identification at trial;
there are essentially three main possibilities.51  The first possibility is
to utilize exclusionary powers to exclude entirely any eyewitness iden-
Race Eyewitness Identification?, in EVALUATING WITNESS EVIDENCE (Sally M. Lloyd-Bos-
tock & Brian R. Clifford eds., 1983); see also CUTLER & PENROD, supra note 28, at 104.
47. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT, supra note 15, at 73.
48. GROSS & SHAFFER, supra note 18, at 49.
49. See, e.g., Wells et al., supra note 28, at 627-36 (setting out rules on who should
conduct the line-up, the instructions that should be given on viewing, the structure of
the line-up and obtaining confidence statements from witnesses); Andrew D. Rikard,
How and Why New York Should Enact Mandatory Statewide Eyewitness Identification
Procedures, 74 ALB. L. REV. 1525, 1549-50 (2010-2011) (making recommendations on
the composure and conduct of line-ups); Richard A. Wise, Kirsten A. Dauphinais & Mar-
tin A. Safer, A Tripartite Solution to Eyewitness Error, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
807, 856-65 (2007) (setting out ten guidelines for the conduct of identification
procedures).
50. See generally Gary L. Wells, Yueran Yang & Laura Smalarz, Eyewitness Identi-
fication: Bayesian Information Gain, Base-Rate Effect–Equivalency Curves, and Reason-
able Suspicion, 39 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 99 (2015) (discussing whether there should be
reasonable-suspicion basis for beginning the identification procedure).
51. A fourth possibility is to require corroboration of identity in cases involving
eyewitness identification. Sandra G. Thompson, Beyond a Reasonable Doubt? Reconsid-
ering Uncorroborated Eyewitness Identification Testimony, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1487,
1541 (2008) (arguing for “the adoption of a corroboration rule in cases in which eyewit-
ness identification testimony is offered.”).
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tification evidence that is particularly weak.52  The second is to use
expert testimony to educate the jury on the risks associated with eye-
witness identification evidence and the factors that might affect the
accuracy of such identifications.53  The third is to achieve the same
result but by way of an instruction given to the jury by the trial
judge.54
At this point it might be questioned whether any such measures
are necessary, especially if the applicable guidelines on pre-trial iden-
tification have been followed.  It has sometimes been argued that ju-
rors are capable of using their everyday knowledge and experience to
evaluate eyewitness identification evidence in the same way as they
evaluate any other testimony and need only be guided by a general
instruction about witness credibility.55  The difficulty here is that
many of the findings of the scientific studies are counter-intuitive and
are unlikely to be within the knowledge of the average juror (or indeed
the average judge56).  One might point in particular to the lack of any
52. See, e.g., Angela Baxter, Identification Evidence in Canada: Problems and a
Potential Solution, 52 CRIM. L.Q. 175, 176 (2007) (suggesting that the trial judge’s dis-
cretion to exclude weak identification evidence could be a “more effective solution” to
the problem of wrongful conviction caused by mistaken eyewitness identification evi-
dence); Margery M. Koosed, Reforming Eyewitness Identification Law and Practice to
Protect the Innocent, 42 CREIGHTON L. REV. 595, 629 (2009) (arguing for a wider exclu-
sionary power for unreliable eyewitness identification evidence); Kent Roach, Unrelia-
ble Evidence and Wrongful Convictions: The Case for Excluding Tainted Identification
Evidence and Jailhouse and Coerced Confessions, 52 CRIM. L.Q. 210, 216 (2007) (argu-
ing that an exclusionary power “could do much valuable work in excluding evidence that
the experience of wrongful convictions suggests can be highly prejudicial”); Eva G.
Shell, A Recipe for Mistaken Convictions: Why Federal Rules of Evidence Should be Used
to Exclude Unreliable Eye-Witness Identification Evidence, 46 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 263,
285 (2013) (arguing for the use of exclusionary powers “in recognition of the potential
for jurors to become unreasonably swayed by this evidence despite substantial
unreliability”).
53. See, e.g., Koosed, supra note 52, at 619 (arguing that “[e]xpert testimony should
be permitted in all cases where the perpetrator’s identity is a central issue, and there is
little or no other independent evidence of the defendant’s guilt.”); Michael R. Leippe,
The Case for Expert Testimony About Eyewitness Memory, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L.
909, 924 (1995) (arguing that “eyewitness expert testimony is not only appropriate, but
needed in certain circumstances to improve the likelihood of a valid jury decision.”);
Wise, Dauphinais & Safer, supra note 49, at 823 (arguing for the admissibility of expert
testimony “when the primary or sole evidence against the defendant is eyewitness
testimony.”).
54. See, e.g., Christian Sheehan, Making the Jurors the Experts: The Case for Eye-
witness Identification Jury Instructions, 52 B.C. L. REV. 651, 683 (2011) (arguing for “a
new model instruction to be given at the outset of criminal trials that involve eyewit-
ness identifications.”); Dufraimont, supra note 6, at 325 (arguing that jury instructions
represent the best way to educate juries about the frailties of eyewitness identification
evidence in the vast majority of cases).
55. See, e.g., Nelson v. State, 362 So. 2d 1017, 1022 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978); Le-
noir v. State, 72 S.W.3d 899, 903, 905 (Ark. Ct. App. 2002).
56. There is a growing body of evidence to suggest that judges hold incorrect beliefs
about the factors affecting the accuracy of eyewitness testimony: see Richard A. Wise &
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correlation between the degree of confidence expressed by eyewit-
nesses at trial and the accuracy of their identifications,57 or to the
detrimental effect of stress or the presence of a weapon on identifica-
tion reliability.58
If it is accepted that there is a need to regulate the use of eyewit-
ness identification evidence at trial, the next question is how this
might best be achieved.  A detailed evaluation of the relative merits of
exclusionary powers, expert testimony, and jury instructions, lies be-
yond the scope of this Article.  It should be said at the outset that
these powers and procedures are not necessarily mutually exclusive.
All three may have an important role to play, depending on the cir-
cumstances of the case.59  The focus here, however, is on the last of the
three possibilities—jury instructions.
Most United States courts allow some form of instruction to be
given to the jury that warns of the dangers of eyewitness identification
evidence.60  Most commonly, the instruction given is based on United
States v. Telfaire,61 where the court stated that:
In appraising the identification testimony of a witness, you
should consider the following:
(1) Are you convinced that the witness had the capacity
and an adequate opportunity to observe the offender?
Whether the witness had an adequate opportunity to observe
the offender at the time of the offense will be affected by such
matters as how long or short a time was available, how far or
close the witness was, how good were lighting conditions,
whether the witness had had occasion to see or know the per-
son in the past . . . .
(2) Are you satisfied that the identification made by the
witness subsequent to the offense was the product of his own
recollection?  You may take into account both the strength of
the identification and the circumstances under which the
identification was made.
Martin A. Safer, What US Judges Know and Believe About Eyewitness Testimony, 18
APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 427, 432 (2004); Svein Magnussen et al., What Judges
Know About Eyewitness Testimony: A Comparison of Norwegian and US Judges, 14
PSYCHOLOGY, CRIME & L. 177, 181 (2008); Richard A. Wise et al., A Comparison of Chi-
nese Judges’ and US Judges’ Knowledge and Beliefs About Eyewitness Testimony, 16
PSYCHOL., CRIME & L. 695, 708 (2010).
57. See supra notes 33-37 and accompanying text.
58. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
59. See Koosed, supra note 52, at 616-17.
60. See Sheehan, supra note 54, at 670-73 (surveying different state practices with
regards to jury instructions); Michael Bromby et al., An Examination of Criminal Jury
Directions in Relation to Eyewitness Identification in Commonwealth Jurisdictions, 36
COMMON L. WORLD REV. 303 (2007) (surveying the approach of other common law
jurisdictions).
61. 469 F.2d 552, (D.C. Cir. 1972).
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If the identification by the witness may have been influ-
enced by the circumstances under which the defendant was
presented to him for identification, you should scrutinize the
identification with great care.  You may also consider the
length of time that lapsed between the occurrence of the
crime and the next opportunity of the witness to see the de-
fendant, as a factor bearing on the reliability of the identifica-
tion . . . .
. . . .
[(3)] Finally, you must consider the credibility of each
identification witness in the same way as any other witness,
consider whether the witness is truthful, and consider
whether the witness had the capacity and opportunity to
make a reliable observation of the matter covered in his
testimony.
I again emphasize that the burden of proof on the prose-
cutor extends to every element of the crime charged, and this
specifically includes the burden of proving beyond a reasona-
ble doubt the identity of the defendant as the perpetrator of
the crime with which [the defendant] stands charged.  If after
examining the testimony, you have a reasonable doubt as to
the accuracy of the identification, you must find the defen-
dant not guilty.62
The Telfaire instruction is not without its flaws.  It has been
criticised on the basis that while it lists some of the factors that might
contribute to misidentification, it is vague as to the factors’ relevance,
does not explain the way in which the factors can affect reliability, and
appears (erroneously) to associate confidence with identification accu-
racy.63  As such, some courts have developed more detailed instruc-
tions, occasionally going so far as to specifically alert jurors to the risk
of a wrongful conviction associated with mistaken eyewitness identifi-
cation evidence.64
In the scholarly literature, a majority view has developed that
jury instructions about eyewitness identification evidence are an inef-
fective safeguard against wrongful conviction.  Some have gone as far
as to describe this view as a “consensus.”65  This is perhaps to over-
state the case, but it is, at the very least, a widely held belief.66  So, for
62. United States v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d 552, 558-60 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
63. See, e.g., Dufraimont, supra note 6, at 306; Sheehan, supra note 54, at 680-81.
64. See, e.g., State v. Henderson 27 A.3d 872, 915 (N.J.S.C. 2011); United States v.
Burrous, 934 F. Supp. 525, 526 (E.D.N.Y 1996); Evan C. Miller, Impermissible Instruc-
tions: State v Henderson and the Ebbing Utility of Eyewitness Evidence, 66 RUTGERS L.
REV. 803, 832-35 (2014).
65. See, e.g., Dufraimont, supra note 6, at 301.
66. Two prominent dissenters are Dufraimont herself, and Sheehan. See supra
note 55 and accompanying text.
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example, in a review of the available evidence undertaken in 1995,
Cutler and Penrod state that “we are forced to conclude that the
judges’ instructions do not serve as an effective safeguard against mis-
taken identifications and convictions.”67  Roach suggests that jury
warnings place “enormous faith in the ability of juries to follow such
instructions, despite the fact that social science and common sense
suggest that warnings may not always have their desired effect.”68  In
one of the most comprehensive reviews of safeguards against wrongful
conviction based on eyewitness misidentification, Wise et al. reach a
similar conclusion to Roach, but argue instead for expert testimony as
a more effective alternative.69
Those who consider jury instructions ineffective tend to base their
conclusions on a body of experimental evidence gained from psycholog-
ical studies undertaken with mock jurors.70  A superficial reading of
the relevant studies might well give the impression that jury instruc-
tions are an ineffective safeguard.  It will be argued here, however,
that closer examination of the studies reveals otherwise, and it is to
this that the Article now turns.
V. THE EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE ON THE
EFFECTIVENESS OF JURY INSTRUCTIONS
In this section of the Article, the experimental evidence on the
effectiveness of jury instructions about eyewitness identification evi-
dence will be evaluated.  Before embarking on a survey of the re-
search, it is necessary to say something about the methods typically
used in the studies, all of which involve mock jurors.  The Article will
then go on to discuss the studies on eyewitness identification instruc-
tions before also considering the findings of studies in closely related
areas.
A. MOCK JURY STUDIES AND THEIR LIMITATIONS
Mock jury studies can have a number of limitations that poten-
tially affect their “external validity:” the extent to which their findings
67. CUTLER & PENROD, supra note 28, at 264.
68. Roach, supra note 52, at 213-14.
69. Wise, Dauphinais & Safer, supra note 49, at 830-33 (quoting BRIAN L. CUTLER
& STEVEN D. PENROD, MISTAKEN IDENTIFICATION: THE EYEWITNESS, PSYCHOLOGY AND
THE LAW 254 (1995)); see also Jacqueline McMurtrie, The Role of the Social Sciences in
Preventing Wrongful Convictions, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1271, 1276 n.20 (2005) (discuss-
ing those who consider jury instructions an ineffective safeguard against wrongful con-
viction); Roger B. Handberg, Expert Testimony on Eyewitness Identification: A New Pair
of Glasses for the Jury, 32 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1013, 1062 (1995); Thompson, supra note
51, at 1517; Baxter, supra note 52, at 182.
70. The relevant studies are discussed in Part V. infra.
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are generalizable beyond the experimental setting.71  These include
inadequate sampling (especially the use of college students as ‘jurors’);
inadequate trial simulation (such as a reliance on a transcript or
study pack rather than a video or trial re-enactment); an absence of
jury deliberation in the research design; the use of data collection
techniques that do not reflect the reality of the juror’s task at trial
(such as asking jurors to rate the probability of guilt on a scale); and
participants’ awareness that they are role playing and that their deci-
sion has no real life consequences.72
The extent to which each of these affects generalizability is con-
tested by psychologists.  In a meta-analysis that is unfailingly cited by
those using the research methods in question,73 Bornstein argued that
the use of student jurors and/or trial transcripts makes very little dif-
ference to research results.74  Others have questioned his conclusions,
suggesting that this depends on the issue being researched.75
There is a broader consensus over the lack of deliberation.76  As
Shaffer and Wheatman put it, “perhaps the greatest limitation of
mock-trial simulations is that the vast majority of them attempt to
draw inferences from decisions rendered by nondeliberating mock ju-
rors rather than deliberating mock juries” and the researchers go on to
discuss some of the reasons why this might be the case.77  The deliber-
ation process, they suggest, potentially irons out any misunderstand-
ings that might be held by individual jurors, and jurors who hold
prejudices (or who are disinclined to follow instructions) might not act
in this way in a group situation where they have to articulate their
reasoning to others.  There is also a vast body of social psychological
71. See generally Wayne Weiten and Shari S. Diamond, A Critical Review of the
Jury Simulation Paradigm: The Case of Defendant Characteristics, 3 L. & HUM. BEHAV.
71 (1979) (displaying the classic exposition of these limitations); Shari S. Diamond, Illu-
minations and Shadows from Jury Simulations, 21 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 561 (1997) (pro-
viding an overview of the methodological issues).
72. Weiten & Diamond, supra note 71, at 78-81.
73. See, e.g., Helen M. Paterson, David W.M. Anderson & Richard I. Kemp, Cau-
tioning Jurors Regarding Co-Witness Discussion: The Impact of Judicial Warnings, 3
PSYCHOL., CRIME & L. 287, 301 (2013).
74. Brian H. Bornstein, The Ecological Validity of Jury Simulations: Is the Jury
Still Out?, 23 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 75, 78-84 (1999).
75. See, e.g., Richard L. Wiener, Daniel A. Krauss & Joel D. Lieberman, Mock Jury
Research: Where Do We Go From Here?, 29 BEHAV. SCIS. & THE L. 467, 472 (2011).
76. See, e.g., Dennis J. Devine, Laura D. Clayton, Benjamin B. Dunford, Rasmy
Seying & Jennifer Pryce, Jury Decision Making: 45 Years of Empirical Research on De-
liberating Groups, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 622, 625 (2001); Narina Nun˜ez, Sean M.
McCrea & Scott E. Culhane, Jury Decision Making Research: Are Researchers Focusing
on the Mouse and not the Elephant in the Room?, 29 BEHAV. SCIS. & THE L. 439, 443
(2011).
77. David R. Shaffer & Shannon R. Wheatman, Does Personality Influence Reac-
tions to Judicial Instructions? Some Preliminary Findings and Possible Implications, 6
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 655, 657-58 (2000).
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literature indicating that group decisions differ from individual deci-
sions78 and research with real jurors has shown that deliberation does
affect the verdict reached in a small but significant proportion of
cases.79
Not all mock jury studies suffer equally from the limitations iden-
tified above, but as this Article will go on to demonstrate, the concerns
noted loom large in the jury instruction studies that are the focus
here.  Indeed, the majority of them have methodological flaws so seri-
ous that little reliance can be placed on them.
B. THE JURY INSTRUCTION STUDIES
An extensive search of legal and psychological databases identi-
fied five studies in peer reviewed journals that have assessed the ef-
fectiveness of jury instructions about eyewitness identification
evidence.80  Any evaluation of these studies needs to keep in mind
that the desired result of a jury instruction on eyewitness identifica-
tion evidence is to induce what has been termed “juror sensitivity” and
not “juror skepticism,” the latter being a general mistrust of eyewit-
ness identification evidence even when this is not merited.81  As such,
any experimental design that does not vary the strength of the eyewit-
ness identification is unlikely to yield any valuable results.82  The use-
fulness of the study is also dependent on the quality of the jury
instruction utilized.  If a particular instruction is difficult to compre-
hend and/or inaccurate, this does not necessarily mean that all jury
instructions are ineffective.  It is worth noting the majority of studies
used the Telfaire instruction, which has been criticized for being
vague and potentially misleading.83  Finally, it is worth repeating the
point, studies vary in the extent to which the experimental design rep-
78. Nun˜ez, McCrea & Culhane, supra note 76, at 443-46.
79. Maria Sandys & Ronald C. Dillehay, First-Ballot Votes, Predeliberation Dispo-
sitions, and Final Verdicts in Jury Trials, 19 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 175, 176 (1995); HARRY
KALVEN & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY (1966).  Kalven and Zeisel, in what was
then a ground-breaking study, recorded the verdicts of juries in a sample of criminal
trials in the 1950s.  They found that the verdict preferred by the majority of jurors on
the first ballot was not the eventual verdict in approximately ten percent of cases.
80. See Brian H. Bornstein & Joseph A. Hamm, Jury Instructions on Witness Iden-
tification, 48 COURT REVIEW 48 (2012), available at http://aja.ncsc.dni.us/publications/
courtrv/cr48-1-2/CR48-1-2Bornstein.pdf (discussing the effectiveness of jury instruc-
tions in eyewitness identification, however, this study was not published in a peer re-
viewed journal and it contains such limited details of its research methods that its
generalizability is impossible to evaluate.).
81. Kirsty A. Martire & Richard I. Kemp, Can Experts Help Jurors to Evaluate
Eyewitness Evidence? A Review of Eyewitness Expert Effects, 16 LEGAL & CRIMINOLOGI-
CAL PSYCHOL. 24, 25-26 (2011) [hereinafter Martire & Kemp, Review of Eyewitness Ex-
pert Effects].
82. Id. at 26.
83. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
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licated the real life trial setting, and studies that do not include an
element of jury deliberation must be regarded with particular caution.
The earliest of the five studies is that of Katzev and Wishart, who
asked 108 mock jurors (forming thirty mock juries) to watch a forty-
minute mock burglary trial.84  The juries were divided into three
groups: the first group received only the standard jury instructions
with no summary of the evidence in the case or special instructions
relating to eyewitness identification evidence; the second group re-
ceived, in addition to this, a judicial summary of the evidence; the
third group received the standard instructions, the judicial summary
of the evidence, and a short judicial instruction on eyewitness identifi-
cation evidence.85  Jurors were asked to make a pre-deliberation deci-
sion about the guilt or innocence of the defendant, before deliberating
in their jury groups and recording a post-deliberation group verdict.86
The authors found that providing a judicial instruction on eyewitness
identification resulted in a significant increase in not-guilty verdicts
pre-deliberation.87  Post-deliberation, the number of not-guilty ver-
dicts was also slightly higher among those juries receiving the instruc-
tion on eyewitness identification evidence, although the finding was
not statistically significant.88  There were, however, numerous weak-
nesses in the experimental design: college student subjects were used;
there was no variation of the strength of the identification evidence;
and the overall evidence against the accused was very weak, as evi-
denced by the fact that, post-deliberation, twenty-seven of the thirty
juries returned not-guilty verdicts.89  As such, little can be usefully
taken from the findings.
The next relevant study was carried out by Cutler et al., in which
mock jurors were given a Telfaire instruction after a videotaped mock
robbery trial in which a witness identified the defendant as the perpe-
trator.90  There were two versions of the experiment, in which the ex-
84. Richard D. Katzev & Scott S. Wishart, The Impact of Judicial Commentary
Concerning Eyewitness Identifications on Jury Decision Making, 76 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMI-
NOLOGY 733, 736 (1985).
85. Id. at 737-38; see also id. at 737 n.18 (providing instructions for the jury).
86. Id. at 739.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 740-41.  It should be noted that table 1 of their paper (at 739) erroneously
omits the word “not” from “not guilty” and is therefore a misleading representation of
their results.
89. Id. at 736, 740; see also id. at 737 n.18 (summarizing the evidence given in the
judge’s charge).
90. Brian L. Cutler, Hedy R. Dexter and Steven D. Penrod, Nonadversarial Meth-
ods for Improving Juror Sensitivity to Eyewitness Evidence, 20 J. APPLIED SOC.
PSYCHOL. 1197 (1990).  The study also compared the effectiveness of jury instructions to
that of testimony from a court appointed expert and its findings in this respect are
discussed below. See infra notes 159-161 and accompanying text.
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perimenters varied the strength of the identification evidence.91  In
the first version, the defendant wore a hat, while brandishing a hand-
gun, and the eyewitness identified him as the perpetrator fourteen
days after the robbery.  In the second version, the robber wore no dis-
guise and kept his handgun hidden, and the identification took place
two days after the robbery.92  The study found some evidence of in-
creased juror sensitivity (as measured by the proportion of guilty ver-
dicts returned) from hearing the instruction, although the effect was
small and not statistically significant.93  Once again, however, the re-
search methods used by the study cast a shadow over the usefulness of
its findings.  The 144 mock jurors were all college students, the experi-
ment did not involve deliberation, and as Cutler, Dexter and Penrod
themselves acknowledge, the poor quality of the Telfaire instruction
may have been to blame for inducing unjustified skepticism in some
participants.94
A further study was undertaken by Ramirez et al., who conducted
two separate experiments, both involving college student subjects
watching a video of a mock trial.95  The first—the robbery of a liquor
store by a lone gunman—used very similar methods to Cutler, Dexter
and Penrod, and found that the Telfaire instruction caused a signifi-
cant skepticism effect.96  Jurors hearing the instruction were less
likely to convict in both the “good” and the “poor” identification condi-
tions.97  The second compared the effectiveness of the Telfaire instruc-
tion with a re-written instruction in which the language was
simplified and the content revised to reflect more accurately the rele-
vant experimental research.98  They found that there was little differ-
ence between the effectiveness of the Telfaire instruction and their re-
written instruction in terms of the proportion of guilty verdicts re-
turned.99  However, this finding must be regarded with caution.  Like
Cutler, Dexter and Pendrod, the mock jurors were college students,
the experiment did not involve deliberation, and the evidence against
the accused was very weak overall.100  Even in the “good identification
conditions” version of the experiment, the only evidence against the
defendant was that of a single eyewitness who viewed him for approxi-
91. Cutler, Penrod & Dexter, supra note 34, at 1199.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 1202.
94. Id. at 1205.
95. Gabriella Ramirez, Dennis Zemba & R. Edward Geiselman, Judge’s Caution-
ary Instructions on Eyewitness Testimony, 14 AM. J. FORENSIC PSYCHOL. 31, 38 (1996).
96. Id. at 41.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 47.  The re-written instruction is re-produced in Appendix B of the paper.
99. Id. at 56.
100. Id. at 47, 50.
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mately twenty seconds while experiencing a traumatic event (the bur-
glary of her house).101  Evidence was also presented at the trial that
the defendant had an alibi; a friend testified that at the time of the
burglary the two of them were together doing plumbing work in the
friend’s kitchen.102  This does suggest that skepticism might, in fact,
have been the most appropriate attitude in both the “good” and “poor”
identification conditions, bearing in mind that the jurors were given
the standard direction that they should convict only if they were con-
vinced beyond reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt.103  It is also
worth noting that the revised instruction did result in a significant
improvement in recall of the instruction’s content and a “modest” in-
crease in juror knowledge about the relevant issues.104
An improvement in the realism of the experimental conditions
can be found in the two experiments undertaken by Edith Greene.105
Her first experiment involved a videotaped assault trial that was
shown to college student “jurors” in which a person drinking in a bar
was accused of throwing a bottle that hit and blinded another cus-
tomer.106  No one actually saw the defendant throw the bottle, but one
of the bar staff testified that the defendant “might have done so.”107
There was no other evidence against the defendant.  The strength of
the identification evidence given by the witness was varied: in the
“strong” version she had an unobstructed view and the bar was well
lit; in the “weak” version the bar was dimly lit and her view was par-
tially obstructed.  The jurors were given a Telfaire instruction and
were allowed thirty minutes of deliberation before reaching a ver-
dict.108  In the second experiment, the conditions were identical, save
for the facts that Greene, like Ramirez et al.: used a revised instruc-
tion which was rewritten to make it linguistically more comprehensi-
ble and to reflect more accurately the findings of relevant
101. This was distinguished from the “poor” identification conditions version by the
fact that the perpetrator was viewed for 20 seconds (rather than five), from five feet
(rather than 15 feet), in good lighting conditions, and had no gun (as opposed to having
a visible gun).  The defendant was also identified two hours after the event (as opposed
to two weeks) and he was picked out in both a photo ID and a lineup (as opposed to only
in the lineup). Id. at 49.
102. Id. at 48.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 57.
105. Edith Greene, Judge’s Instruction on Eyewitness Testimony: Evaluation and
Revision, 18 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 252 (1998).
106. Id. at 256.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 257.
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psychological research; and used a shadow jury rather than college
student subjects.109
Greene found that the Telfaire instruction, when it was given,
caused a significant skepticism effect—the conviction rate decreased
from 42 percent to 6.5 percent—even for the strong identification evi-
dence version of the experiment.110  It had no effect when the weak
identification evidence was used, where the conviction rate was three
percent regardless of whether the jury had been given the instruction,
but as Cutler and Penrod point out, this was probably because the
weak evidence was so weak that it would have been perverse to con-
vict on it.111  In Greene’s second experiment, the revised instruction
also induced skepticism rather than sensitivity, which resulted in a
higher proportion of acquittals in the weak identification evidence
condition.112  However, it also resulted in a higher proportion of ac-
quittals in the strong identification evidence condition.113
Greene’s second experiment is without question the study that
has used the most realistic experimental conditions, and comprehensi-
ble and accurate jury instruction, and yet this still induced skepticism
rather than sensitivity.  This might imply that jury instructions on
eyewitness identification evidence are of limited usefulness.  However,
her research design still had important limitations.  It was a single
experiment involving only 139 jurors where deliberation was limited
to thirty minutes, after which jurors were asked to vote individually
(rather than reach a collective decision).  Most problematically, the
eyewitness identification evidence was actually very weak, even in the
“strong” version of the experiment, as noted above.114  The only evi-
dence against the defendant was the testimony of a single eyewitness,
who, when asked if the defendant was the person who threw the bot-
tle, said only that the defendant “might have done so.”115  As such,
skepticism was entirely appropriate.116  It is worth noting that
Greene’s rewritten instruction was extremely effective in improving
juror understanding of the factors affecting the accuracy of eyewitness
109. Id. at 263-64.  A shadow jury involves the use of real life jurors who have been
summoned to court but not ultimately selected for trial.
110. Id. at 258.
111. Id. at 258; see also CUTLER & PENROD supra note 28, at 260 (describing the
“floor effect”).
112. Greene, supra note 105, at 266.  Table 4 shows seventy-three percent where a
revised instruction was given, compared to forty-two percent where no instruction was
given, and forty-one percent where a Telfaire instruction was given. Id.
113. Id.  Table 4 shows seventy-five percent where a revised instruction was given,
compared to twenty-two percent for no instruction, and thirty-five percent for the
Telfaire instruction. Id.
114. Id. at 266.
115. Id. at 256 (emphasis added).
116. Id. at 264.
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identifications.117  Jurors who were given the rewritten instruction
scored significantly better on this measure than jurors who were given
no instruction or the Telfaire instruction.118
Finally, a rather different research method was used in a study
undertaken by Martire and Kemp.119  They used what they called a
“real eyewitness design” where a first set of study participants acted
as “witnesses” who were asked to view a video reconstruction of a rob-
bery and then identify the perpetrator from a line-up.120  They then
“gave evidence” and a second set of study participants acting as “ju-
rors” were asked whether or not they believed them.121  This could
then be compared to the true accuracy of the identifications.  The ju-
rors in the experiment were college students and were divided into six
groups where the experimental conditions were varied so that they
watched either a “correct” or a “mistaken” witness give evidence and
they received either a jury instruction,122 a video of expert testimony
on eyewitness identification, or no assistance at all.  The researchers
found that jurors were correct in their assessments 63.6 percent of the
time, but that there was no significant difference between the jury in-
struction group, the expert testimony group, and the control group:
“the objective accuracy of the judgments they made were not found to
be significantly associated with the type of instruction they heard.”123
But the usefulness of this study is questionable at best.  The num-
ber of mock jurors who witnessed each of the six possible scenarios
was very small and the study design did not include any element of
deliberation.  In addition, the “witnesses” watched a video reconstruc-
tion rather than experiencing a real life event where environmental
conditions and stress would most likely have played a part in the accu-
racy of their identification.  Most importantly, the conditions in which
the witnesses saw the perpetrator were not varied and therefore the
only variables the jurors had to go on in determining accuracy were
the witnesses’ reported confidence levels and their demeanour at trial.
As such, little can be usefully concluded about the effectiveness of jury
instructions on eyewitness identification evidence.
117. Id. at 267.
118. Id. at 259-60.
119. Kirsty A. Martire & Richard I. Kemp, The Impact of Eyewitness Expert Evi-
dence and Judicial Instruction on Juror Ability to Evaluate Eyewitness Testimony, 33 L.
& HUM. BEHAV. 225 (2009) [hereinafter Martire & Kemp, Impact of Eyewitness Expert
Evidence and Judicial Instruction].
120. Id. at 227.
121. Id. at 230.
122. Id.
123. Martire & Kemp, Impact of Eyewitness Expert Evidence and Judicial Instruc-
tion, supra note 119, at 231-33.
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To summarise, all that can really be said on the basis of the exper-
imental studies on the effectiveness of jury instructions about eyewit-
ness identification evidence is that they are inconclusive.  The studies
are, as Dufraimont puts it, “few in number . . . plagued with method-
ological problems and focus predominantly on the Telfaire instruction,
which lacks the kind of informational content necessary to educate ju-
rors about the frailties of eyewitness identification.”124  The two stud-
ies that evaluated the effect of a revised instruction (Greene’s
experiment, Ramirez et al.’s experiment) were, frustratingly, both
hampered by the fact that the evidence against the defendant was
weak even in the version of the experiment where it was supposed to
be strong.  Thus, while both reported a skepticism effect, skepticism
was an entirely appropriate attitude.  It is worth reiterating that both
studies found that rewritten instructions improved juror comprehen-
sion of the relevant issues when compared to no instruction at all, or
the Telfaire instruction.
C. STUDIES IN CLOSELY RELATED AREAS
Given the limited number of studies of jury instructions about
eyewitness identification evidence, it is worth turning to some of the
experimental evidence in closely related areas.  Studies on the effec-
tiveness of jury instructions in helping jurors to evaluate particular
types of evidence other than eyewitness identification evidence are
few and far between, most likely because few other types of evidence
are so inherently problematic.  Nonetheless, there are a few studies
where the issues being investigated are sufficiently similar, and thus,
worth considering.
The first of these is a study by Paterson et al. that examined eye-
witness evidence but in a different context.125  The researchers ex-
amined the impact of a jury instruction about the effect of post-event
discussion among eyewitnesses in a dangerous driving case.  Mock ju-
rors were given a transcript of a dangerous driving trial where eyewit-
ness evidence was given by two witnesses.126  One gave evidence to
the effect that she had seen the defendant using a cell phone.  She did
not mention this to the police in the statement she made to them im-
mediately after the incident, but told them about it later after she had
spoken to another witness to the event.  The other witness mentioned
the mobile phone in both her initial statement and in a later inter-
124. Dufraimont, supra note 6, at 306.
125. See Paterson, Anderson & Kemp, supra note 73, at 301 (contrasting the study
with others before it).
126. Id. at 292.
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view.127  Half of the participants were given a jury instruction that
explained that “eyewitness evidence can be unreliable and that relia-
bility might be affected by the circumstances in which the witness ob-
served the event.”128  The other half were given the same general
warning, but were also given a specific warning about “the possible
effect of co-witness discussion on memory.”129
In Paterson et al.’s experiment, the specific warning did not in-
duce general skepticism, but instead resulted in a marked sensitivity
effect: there was a significant reduction in belief of the testimony of
the inconsistent witness when the specific warning was given, com-
pared to the general warning condition.130  Such a reduction did not
occur in relation to the consistent witness.131  This did not translate
into a change in beliefs about the guilt or innocence of the defendant,
but as the researchers suggest, this could be for any multitude of rea-
sons, including the strength of the rest of the evidence in the case.132
That said, the findings must be still regarded with some caution.  This
was not the most realistic of experiments: the mock jurors were 80
college students; it involved a transcript rather than a video recon-
struction; and there was no deliberation.
Aside from this single experiment that has focused on eyewitness
evidence in a different context, one might also look to studies that
have evaluated the effect of jury instructions on other types of witness
testimony.  Two mock jury studies in particular are worth noting.  The
first study was undertaken by Bollingmo et al., who evaluated the ef-
fectiveness of an instruction aimed at correcting the misconception
that the extent to which a witness displays emotion provides a reliable
cue to her credibility.133  Participants watched a five-minute video of a
mock police interview in which a woman gave an account of a rape.134
Experimental conditions were varied, so that: (a) the witness dis-
played varying degrees of emotion when giving her statement; and (b)
the participants were either given an instruction warning of the dan-
ger of equating emotional condition with truthfulness or were not.135
The instruction was found to be highly effective at correcting any mis-
conceptions held by participants in this respect, with the groups who
were given the instruction reporting that they had given less weight to
127. Id. at 293.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 297.
131. Id. at 299.
132. Id. at 300.
133. Guri Bollingmo et al., The Effect of Biased and Non-biased Information on
Judgments of Witness Credibility, 15 PSYCHOL., CRIME AND L. 61 (2009).
134. Id. at 63.
135. Id. at 64.
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non-verbal cues and delivering higher credibility ratings of the wit-
ness than the group who were not.136  Notwithstanding, it does have
to be said that the research methods used were not the most realistic
in terms of simulating the trial experience: the 334 subjects were col-
lege students; there was no deliberation built into the experiment; and
the jury instruction was delivered verbally by the experimenter after
the conclusion of the video.137  Given that the effect of the jury in-
struction was positive even in unrealistic conditions, these concerns
might be seen as less pressing than in the eyewitness identification
evidence experiments, where the less than realistic experimental con-
ditions might well have been the reason why a positive effect was not
produced.138  It does have to be said, though, that the experimental
conditions were vastly simplified compared to a real life trial where
jurors would be subject to a far greater volume and complexity of in-
formation than they were here, so it cannot simply be assumed that
any positive effect would be replicated in the real life setting.
The other experiment worth noting was undertaken by Goodman-
Delahunty et al., who examined the effectiveness of jury instructions
in correcting common misconceptions about child memory of and re-
sponses to sexual abuse.139  The study participants were asked to read
a transcript of evidence given by a child reporting sexual abuse.140  In
the first experimental condition, the transcript included a case sum-
mation by the trial judge but no information specifically relating to
child witnesses.141  In the second experimental condition, the tran-
script also contained an instruction setting out the key scientific find-
ings about children’s reactions to sexual abuse, their ability to recall
experienced events and various other relevant matters.142  The study
concluded that jury instructions significantly increased juror knowl-
edge of the key scientific findings and resulted in an increased likeli-
hood of a guilty verdict.143  Here too, as the researchers themselves
acknowledge, the research methods used were less than realistic: their
subjects were 118 college psychology students; they relied on tran-
scripts, rather than a trial simulation; and there was no deliberation
136. Id. at 67.
137. Id. at 64.
138. See supra notes 91-132 and accompanying text.
139. Jane Goodman-Delahunty, Anne Cossins & Kate O’Brien, A Comparison of Ex-
pert Evidence and Judicial Instructions to Counter Misconceptions in Child Sexual
Abuse Trials, 44 AUSTRALIAN & NEW ZEALAND J. CRIMINOLOGY 196, 208 (2011).
140. Id. at 204.
141. Id. at 204.
142. Id. at 206.  There was also a third version of the experiment where the instruc-
tions were delivered by an expert witness. Id. at 205; see infra note 162 and accompany-
ing text.
143. Id. at 208, 211.
576 CREIGHTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49
built into the experiment.144  The effect of the instruction here was
positive, and so the less than realistic conditions cannot be blamed for
failing to produce an effect, but as with Bollingmo et al.’s study, it is
impossible to know whether the same effect would have been produced
in the more complex setting of a real life trial.
The other body of literature to which one might turn is the studies
that have evaluated the effectiveness of expert testimony on eyewit-
ness identification evidence.  These have vastly outnumbered the
studies of jury instructions in this context, as indicated by the fact
that there exist several meta-analyses of the latter but none of the
former.145  Martire and Kemp’s meta-analysis identified twenty-four
experiments reported in peer-reviewed journals, some of which found
that expert testimony induced a general skepticism effect, but some of
which found that it improved juror sensitivity.146  This might be seen
as a cause for optimism, as the fact that expert testimony is capable of
inducing sensitivity (albeit in experimental conditions with all the
generalizability caveats that this implies) suggests that appropriate
jury instructions might do likewise.  This especially, as many of the
expert testimony experiments used “court appointed experts” who
were not cross-examined, was not dissimilar to that of a jury
instruction.147
This does, of course, raise the question of whether expert testi-
mony might be more effective than jury instructions as a safeguard
against wrongful conviction based on eyewitness identification evi-
dence.  A detailed discussion of the relative merits of these two safe-
guards lies beyond the scope of this Article.148  The claim being made
here is not that expert testimony is ineffective in this context, but that
jury instructions are effective.  Although it should be said that if confi-
dence can be placed in the effectiveness of jury instructions, there are
many reasons to prefer them over expert testimony, not least of which
is cost, both in terms of time and money.149  Two experiments have
directly compared the effectiveness of jury instructions and expert tes-
144. Id. at 204, 213.
145. See, e.g., Martire & Kemp, Review of Eyewitness Expert Effects, supra note 81;
Leippe, supra note 53.
146. Martire & Kemp, Review of Eyewitness Expert Effects, supra note 81, at 25, 30.
The findings of the studies are summarised in their paper in tabular form in Table 1. Id.
at 30.
147. See Leippe, supra note 53, at 934-39 (describing the impact of expert testimony
in various studies).  It should perhaps be said that an expert by virtue of his or her
qualifications, might be regarded by jurors as more persuasive than a trial judge.
148. See Sheehan, supra note 54, at 674-78 (providing an excellent discussion of the
relative merits of expert testimony and jury instruction).
149. Derek Simmonsen, Teach Your Jurors Well: Using Jury Instructions to Educate
Jurors About Factors Affecting the Accuracy of Eyewitness Testimony, 70 MD. L. REV.
1044, 1078-85 (2011); cf. Miller, supra note 64, at 839.
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timony in the context of eyewitness identification evidence, both of
which were described above in the context of their findings on jury
instructions.150  Neither found any evidence that expert testimony
was a superior method of inducing sensitivity, although as both stud-
ies suffered from methodological flaws, this finding does have to be
regarded with some caution.151  A comparison of expert testimony and
jury instructions in a different context, the study of child witness testi-
mony in sexual abuse trials discussed above, also found both to be
equally effective in correcting misconceptions.152
D. A SUMMARY SO FAR
As the discussion thus far has indicated, the experimental studies
that have examined the effectiveness of jury instructions about eye-
witness testimony are inconclusive.  The limited number of studies
that have been undertaken have mostly shown that jury instructions
tend to result in increased skepticism towards all eyewitness identifi-
cation evidence, regardless of its strength.  This conclusion, however,
has to be tempered by the fact that every single study—even the most
realistic—suffered from serious methodological problems.  Support for
the effectiveness of jury instructions can be drawn from the expert
testimony studies, some of which have been found to induce sensitiv-
ity, and from an experiment that examined eyewitness testimony and
witness contamination.  Finally, there is some cause for optimism in
the fact that at least two studies (Greene’s experiment and Ramirez et
al.’s experiment) have shown that a well-constructed instruction can
improve juror appreciation of the factors affecting the reliability of
eyewitness identification evidence.  Furthermore, jury instructions on
witness credibility in other contexts (namely the effect of emotion on
credibility and the factors affecting the credibility of child sexual
abuse complaints) have been effective in improving appreciation of the
relevant issues.  There are, in summary, grounds for cautious opti-
mism that jury instructions on eyewitness identification can work, a
conclusion far removed from the accepted scholarly wisdom that they
are entirely ineffective.
Their effectiveness is, however, likely to depend on their content
and on the manner in which they are presented.  As such, it is worth
turning to the broader body of research that has examined the factors
that can improve the effectiveness of jury instructions.
150. Cutler, Penrod & Dexter, supra note 34; Martire & Kemp, Impact of Eyewitness
Expert Evidence and Judicial Instruction, supra note 119.
151. Cutler, Penrod & Dexter, supra note 34, at 1202; Martire & Kemp, Impact of
Eyewitness Expert Evidence and Judicial Instruction, supra note 119, at 231; see supra
notes 100-105 and accompanying text; supra notes 129-132 and accompanying text.
152. Goodman-Delahunty, Cossins & O’Brien, supra note 139, at 208, 211.
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VI. WHAT CAN BE DONE TO IMPROVE THE EFFECTIVENESS
OF JURY INSTRUCTIONS?
What then can be done to maximize the effectiveness of jury in-
structions about eyewitness identification?  Once again it is worth
turning to the relevant experimental evidence.  Three factors in par-
ticular stand out: simplification of language; ensuring that the in-
structions accurately reflect the relevant considerations; and
providing instructions in writing.  Each will be examined in turn.
A. SIMPLIFICATION OF LANGUAGE
If jury instructions are to be effective, they need to convey infor-
mation in a way that jurors can understand and utilize.153  Over-com-
plex jury instructions are likely to be ineffective at best and counter-
productive at worst.154  A vast body of experimental research exists
that has assessed the extent to which juries comprehend the instruc-
tions they are given by trial judges and, as Comiskey puts it, these
“have almost unanimously concluded that a jury’s ability to compre-
hend legal instructions is poor and that there is room for considerable
improvement.”155
To give some examples, Haney and Lynch, in a study of death
penalty instructions in California, found that jurors were unable to
apply them because they did not know what “mitigating” or “aggravat-
ing” meant.156  Rose and Ogloff tested Canadian mock jurors’ compre-
hension of an instruction on conspiracy and concluded that it was
“abysmally poor.”157  In research undertaken with forty-eight real life
criminal juries for the New Zealand Law Commission, Young et al.
asked jurors about the instructions they had received (which included
instructions on the ingredients of the offence, the meaning of intent
and the meaning of beyond reasonable doubt).  They concluded that,
“there were widespread misunderstandings about aspects of the law
which persisted through to, and significantly influenced, jury deliber-
153. Dufraimont, supra note 6, at 297; Sheehan, supra note 54, at 687; QUEENSLAND
LAW REFORM COMMISSION, A REVIEW OF JURY DIRECTIONS, ¶ 8.25 (2009).
154. NEW SOUTH WALES LAW REFORM COMMISSION, JURY DIRECTIONS, ¶ 1.68 (2012).
155. Marie Comiskey, Initiating Dialogue About Jury Comprehension of Legal Con-
cepts: Can the ‘Stagnant Pool’ Be Revitalised?, 35 QUEEN’S L.J. 625, 629 (2010); see, e.g.,
V. Gordon Rose & James R. Ogloff, The Comprehension of Judicial Instructions, in PSY-
CHOLOGY AND THE LAW: AN EMPIRICAL PERSPECTIVE 407 (Neil Brewer & Kipling D. Wil-
liams eds., 2005); Nancy S. Marder, Bringing Jury Instructions Into the Twenty-First
Century, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 449 (2006).
156. Craig Haney & Mona Lynch, Comprehending Life and Death Matters: A Pre-
liminary Study of California’s Capital Penalty Instructions, 18 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 411
(1994).
157. V. Gordon Rose & James R. Ogloff, Evaluating the Comprehensibility of Jury
Instructions: A Method and an Example, 25 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 409, 429 (2001).
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ations.  Indeed, there were only thirteen of the forty-eight trials in
which fairly fundamental misunderstandings of the law at the deliber-
ation stage did not emerge.”158
In the UK, Thomas was granted access in three English Crown
Courts to jurors who had not been selected to sit on a trial.159  The
jurors observed a simulated trial and were given instructions from a
practicing trial judge.  In one court, jurors were tested on their under-
standing of an instruction they had received on the law of self-defense.
While sixty-eight percent of jurors claimed that they had understood
the instruction, when assessed objectively, only thirty-one percent ac-
tually had.160
It has been suggested that there is no reason to be concerned
about findings such as these because any difficulty individual jurors
have in understanding instructions will be resolved during the delib-
eration process.161  Deliberation can undoubtedly affect trial out-
comes, as noted earlier, and the studies that have examined the effect
of deliberation on juror comprehension provide some support for its
effectiveness in correcting mistakes.162  Its curative power should not,
however, be over-stated.163  Deliberation will be effective in this re-
spect only if, as Diamond puts it, “a significant proportion of the jurors
begin deliberations with correct information; otherwise, deliberation
may simply reinforce the inaccuracies of the majority.”164  In Rose and
Ogloff’s study of the comprehension of the conspiracy instruction, de-
liberation made no difference and the inherent complexity of the in-
struction was the most likely reason why.165
It might be questioned at this point how much of the preceding
discussion is relevant to instructions on eyewitness identification evi-
dence, which are relatively straightforward compared to some of the
instructions that have been the subject of research.  Juror comprehen-
sion levels have been shown to vary depending on the type of instruc-
158. WARREN YOUNG, NEIL CAMERON & YVETTE TINSLEY, JURIES IN CRIMINAL TRIALS
PART TWO: A SUMMARY OF THE RESEARCH FINDINGS, ¶ 7.12 (1999); Yvette Tinsely, Juror
Decision-Making; A Look Inside The Jury Room, 4 BRITISH SOCIETY OF CRIMINOLOGY
(2001).
159. CHERYL THOMAS, ARE JURIES FAIR?, 8-9 (2010).
160. Id. at 36.
161. See, e.g., YOUNG, CAMERON & TINSLEY, supra note 158, at ¶ 7.25.
162. See supra notes 83-87 and accompanying text; Diamond, supra note 71, at 565;
Phoebe C. Ellsworth & Alan Reifman, Juror Comprehension and Public Policy: Per-
ceived Problems and Proposed Solutions, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 788, 806 (2000).
163. Comiskey, supra note 155, at 641.
164. Diamond, supra note 71, at 565.
165. Rose & Ogloff, supra note 157, at 426.
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tion, with instructions about procedural law generally being better
understood than those about substantive law.166
Even if this is the case, there is nonetheless no harm in ensuring
that jury instructions about eyewitness identification evidence are
made as linguistically straightforward as possible, while of course also
retaining their legal integrity.167  This has been recognised in other
jurisdictions—the New Zealand Institute of Judicial Studies, for ex-
ample, has employed editors with expertise in writing plain English in
the preparation of the Criminal Jury Trials Bench Book.168  Indeed,
experimental research has demonstrated that comprehension can be
substantially improved by the use of simple language and straightfor-
ward syntax.169  Charrow and Charrow, for example, found that juror
comprehension improved by between thirty-five and forty-one percent
(depending on the measure of comprehension used) when they re-
wrote fourteen United States civil jury instructions in simpler lan-
guage.170  In the criminal context, other studies have achieved similar
results.171  The re-written instructions in all of these studies were ap-
proved by trial judges, who checked that the re-write was legally
acceptable.
B. THE CONTENT OF THE WARNING
If jury instructions are to be effective, they need to convey accu-
rate information about, for example, the factors that have been shown
166. Comiskey, supra note 155, at 642; Alan Reifman, Spencer M. Gusick & Phoebe
C. Ellsworth, Real Jurors’ Understanding of the Law in Real Cases, 16 L. & HUM.
BEHAV. 539, 546-50 (1992).
167. See Simmonsen, supra note 149, at 1086 (stating that a jury instruction should
resemble a professor lecturing to students).
168. NEW SOUTH WALES LAW REFORM COMMISSION, supra note 154, at ¶ 3.25.
169. See, e.g., Rose & Ogloff, supra note 157, at 427-29 (providing that a simple,
streamlined technique of giving jury instructions is ideal); Joel D. Lieberman & Bruce
D. Sales, What Social Science Teaches Us About the Jury Instruction Process, 3
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 589, 626-27 (1997).
170. Robert P. Charrow & Veda R. Charrow, Making Legal Language Understanda-
ble: A Psycholinguistic Study of Jury Instructions, 79 COLOM. L. REV. 1306, 1331 (1979).
The instructions were on issues including causation, witness credibility, expert evi-
dence, and negligence. Id.  The authors set out a method for improving comprehension,
which includes measures such as removing nominalizations, prepositional phrases,
technical words, multiple negatives, and embedded phrases. Id. at 1321-29.
171. See, e.g., Laurence J. Severance, Edith Greene & Elizabeth F. Loftus, Toward
Criminal Jury Instructions That Jurors Can Understand, 75 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
198 (1984) (testing comprehension of instructions on the standard and burden of proof,
intent, and the use of prior convictions and achieving significant improvements in com-
prehension following their re-write); Amiram Elwork, James J. Alfini & Bruce Sales,
Towards Understandable Jury Instructions, 65 JUDICATURE 432 (1982) (finding that
comprehension improved significantly when they re-wrote standard pattern instruc-
tions on a variety of issues including the meaning of beyond reasonable doubt, the defi-
nition of murder, the definition of insanity and the permitted use of expert evidence).
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to influence the accuracy of eyewitness identification.172  Instructions
in some jurisdictions have been criticized on the basis that they either
omit important information or are actively misleading (for example by
suggesting that the degree of confidence reported by the eyewitness at
the time of the trial is an indication of accuracy).173
Experimental research has also suggested that juries are more
likely to follow instructions if it is explained to them why they are
being given.174  In the present context, this implies that a jury in-
struction on eyewitness identification evidence ought to explain to the
jury that people have been wrongly convicted on the basis of flawed
evidence of this nature, or that errors in identification have occurred
in the past.  However, this type of instruction would have to be care-
fully drafted so as not to induce undue skepticism.175
C. PROVIDING WRITTEN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
A final consideration is whether jury instructions should be pro-
vided in writing, something that has been advocated by numerous law
reform bodies176 and researchers177 worldwide.  In New Zealand, the
jury research project undertaken in 2001 resulted in the extensive use
172. Keith A. Findley, Judicial Gatekeeping of Suspect Evidence: Due Process and
Evidentiary Rules in the Age of Innocence, 47 GA. L. REV. 723, 773 (2013); David
Ormerod, Sounds Familiar? Voice Identification Evidence, CRIM. L. REV. 595, 620 (2001)
(emphasising the point specifically in relation to voice identification).
173. Sheehan, supra note 54, at 679 (citing Commonwealth v. Santoli, 680 N.E.2d
1116, 1121 (Mass. 1997)).
174. Nancy K. Steblay et al., The Impact on Juror Verdicts of Judicial Instruction to
Disregard Inadmissible Evidence: A Meta-Analysis, 30 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 469, 486
(2006); Ellsworth & Reifman, supra note 162, at 805; Saul M. Kassin & Samuel R. Som-
mers, Inadmissible Testimony, Instructions to Disregard, and the Jury: Substantive Ver-
sus Procedural Considerations, 23 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1046, 1046
(1997).
175. United States v. Burrous, 934 F. Supp. 525, 530-33 (E.D.N.Y 1996).  The full
instruction is attached as an appendix to the case report and states inter alia:
I want to caution you, first, that the kind of identification testimony you heard
in this case must be scrutinized carefully.  Scientific studies have amply
demonstrated the dangers of mistake in human perception and identification.
Of course, this does not mean that the identification in this case is incorrect.  I
merely tell you this so that you understand the importance of carefully evaluat-
ing the evidence here.
Burrous, 934 F. Supp. at 530-33.
176. See, e.g., LORD JUSTICE AULD, REVIEW OF THE CRIMINAL COURTS OF ENGLAND
AND WALES 533 (2001); NEW SOUTH WALES LAW REFORM COMMISSION, supra note 154, at
¶ 6.121; NEW ZEALAND LAW COMMISSION, JURIES IN CRIMINAL TRIALS ¶ 314 (2001); VIC-
TORIAN LAW REFORM COMMISSION, JURY DIRECTIONS (2009) (recommendations 43 and 44
at ¶¶ 6.46-6.60).
177. See Robert F. Forston, Sense and Non-sense: Jury Trial Communication, 1975
B.Y.U. L. REV. 601, 619 (1975) (stating, “the advantages of using written instructions
are dramatic”); Comiskey, supra note 155, at 653; Devine, Clayton, Dunford, Seying &
Pryce, supra note 77, at 712; B. Michael Dann, Learning Lessons and Speaking Rights:
Creating Educated and Democratic Juries, 68 IND. L.J. 1229, 1259 (1993).
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of written instructions in that jurisdiction178 and they are increas-
ingly used in Canada179 and in some United States jurisdictions.180
It has been argued that written instructions can lead to a number
of benefits: improvements in memory;181 improvements in comprehen-
sion;182 better quality deliberations (where more time is spent apply-
ing the law);183 reduced deliberation time (as juries spend less time
trying to recall the instructions and any disputes about their content
are quickly and easily resolved);184 and improvements in juror confi-
dence and satisfaction.185  In relation to the first of these, Semmler
and Brewer make the point that we are asking an awful lot of jurors to
retain the information provided by the trial judge—even the simplest
charge is likely to run to several pages of instructions—and it may be
that at least some barriers to increased comprehension may simply
stem from limitations in working memory.186  Some possible objec-
tions to written instructions include: the fear that they might increase
deliberation time (because jurors become involved in time consuming
arguments over how to interpret them);187 that they might be time
consuming and burdensome for trial judges to produce;188 or that they
assume a level of juror literacy that might not be borne out in
practice.189
The available research suggests that all (or, at worst, most) of the
advantages are borne out in practice and that none of the disadvan-
178. William Young, Summing-Up to Juries in Criminal Cases – What Jury Re-
search Says About Current Rules and Practice, CRIM. L. REV. 665, 669 (2003); Nic
Madge, Summing Up: A Judge’s Perspective, CRIM. L. REV. 817, 820 (2006).  Written
instructions were commonly used even prior to the research. See NEW ZEALAND LAW
COMMISSION, supra note 176, at ¶ 314.
179. Madge, supra note 178, at 820.
180. Id. at 820; Marder, supra note 155, at 451.
181. Marder, supra note 155, at 452; Young, supra note 178, at 684; Larry Heuer &
Steven D. Penrod, Instructing Jurors: A Field Experiment With Written and Preliminary
Instructions, 13 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 409, 411 (1989); NEW SOUTH WALES LAW REFORM
COMMISSION, supra note 176, at ¶ 6.119.
182. NEW SOUTH WALES LAW REFORM COMMISSION, JURY DIRECTIONS, ¶ 10.13
(2008); Young, supra note 178, at 684.
183. Forston, supra note 177, at 619.
184. NEW SOUTH WALES LAW REFORM COMMISSION, supra note 176, at ¶ 10.14;
Heuer & Penrod, supra note 181, at 411.
185. Forston, supra note 177, at 620; Heuer and Penrod, supra note 181, at 411;
NEW SOUTH WALES LAW REFORM COMMISSION, supra note 176, at ¶ 10.16.
186. Carolyn Semmler & Neil Brewer, Using a Flow-Chart To Improve Comprehen-
sion of Jury Instructions, 9 PSYCHIATRY, PSYCHOL. & L. 262, 267 (2002).
187. NEW SOUTH WALES LAW REFORM COMMISSION, supra note 154, at ¶ 6.115; Wil-
liam W. Schwarzer, Communicating With Juries: Problems and Remedies, 69 CAL. L.
REV. 731, 756 (1981); Lieberman & Sales, supra note 169, at 626.
188. NEW SOUTH WALES LAW REFORM COMMISSION, supra note 154, at ¶ 6.115;
Heuer & Penrod, supra note 181, at 412.
189. NEW SOUTH WALES LAW REFORM COMMISSION, supra note 154, at ¶ 6.115; For-
ston, supra note 177, at 620.
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tages transpire.  In England and Wales, a trial judge on the criminal
circuit adopted the practice of giving written instructions to jurors in
all cases for a period of several months.  He concluded that this “seems
to have almost eliminated requests from juries for reminders or fur-
ther guidance on the law.  Juries also seem to be reaching verdicts
more quickly.”190  Marder notes that a United States judge who has
given each juror a written copy of her instructions for more than a
decade, described the innovation as “wildly successful” and as “an in-
expensive, effective way to virtually guarantee juror understanding of
the law.”191  Admittedly these studies are anecdotal, unscientific, and
small scale,192 but their findings are supported by surveys of real life
jurors.  These have found that jurors who were not provided with writ-
ten instructions thought that written instructions would have assisted
them in their task193 and that jurors who did receive written instruc-
tions found them useful.194
The anecdotal evidence is also supported by the findings of experi-
mental research,195 the most extensive being that of Heuer and Pen-
rod.196  In their study, twenty-nine judges in Wisconsin randomly
assigned their trials so that some juries received written instructions
and some did not.  After the trial was over, the jurors were asked to
complete questionnaires aimed at testing their understanding of the
instructions they received.197  The jurors were also asked a number of
questions about their experience of jury service.198  The researchers
also canvassed the views of the judges involved.  They found no evi-
dence of any of the potential drawbacks of written instructions.  Writ-
190. Madge, supra note 178, at 821.
191. Marder, supra note 155, at 500 (citing Hon. Jacqueline A. Connor, Jurors Need
to Have Their Own Copies of Instructions, L.A. DAILY JOURNAL, February 25 2004, at 7).
192. As Madge himself accepts, see Madge, supra note 178, at 822.
193. Brian L. Cutler & Donna M. Hughes, Judging Jury Service: Results of the
North Carolina Administrative Office of the Courts Jurors Survey, 19 BEHAV. SCI. & THE
L. 305, 313 (2001) (surveying 1478 people who had served as jurors); YOUNG, CAMERON
& TINSLEY, supra note 158, at ¶ 7.60 (explaining that only twenty-four percent of their
sample of serving jurors did not think that written instructions would have been help-
ful; 62.2 percent thought that they would have been helpful and 13.8 percent gave no
response).
194. YOUNG, CAMERON & TINSLEY, supra note 158, at ¶ 7.59 (where the jury received
written instructions “they were almost invariably appreciative”).
195. See Comiskey, supra note 155, at 653-56 (providing an overview of the studies);
Ellsworth & Reifman, supra note 162, at 803-04; Lieberman & Sales, supra note 169, at
626-27.
196. Heuer & Penrod, supra note 181, at 409.
197. Id. at 417.  Specifically, those relating to the standard and burden of proof, the
presumption of innocence, the evaluation of testimony and exhibits, and procedural is-
sues such as the allocation of responsibility for findings of law and fact. Id.
198. Id.
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ten instructions made no significant difference to deliberation time,199
and the judges involved reported that providing them was not burden-
some or disruptive.200  In terms of the possible advantages, jurors re-
ported that the written instructions were very helpful in settling any
disputes that did arise.201  The researchers did not, however, find that
the written instructions led to any improvement in the comprehension
of legal concepts.202  Despite this, the researchers concluded that their
results presented “a compelling case” for written instructions and that
while they might not have all the advantages claimed, they did have
some clear benefits and they had no harmful consequences.203
Heuer and Penrod are not alone in finding that written instruc-
tions did not lead to improvements in comprehension,204 but other
studies have reported improvements.  Kramer and Koenig, for exam-
ple, found that jurors who received written instructions did score bet-
ter on “true/false” tests aimed at measuring comprehension of a wide
range of criminal jury instructions.205  Thomas’ research in England
and Wales found that the proportion of jurors who were able to answer
correctly two questions aimed at testing understanding of a self-de-
fense instruction rose from thirty-one percent to forty-eight percent
when a written instruction was provided.206  These findings suggest
that at least some of the incorrect answers were due to failures of
memory and not of comprehension.
In fact, a research design that failed to distinguish between mem-
ory and understanding may well account for Heuer and Penrod’s find-
ing that written instructions did not improve comprehension.  In their
study, the jurors completed comprehension questionnaires some time
199. Id. at 421.  The mean reported deliberation time was 2.6 hours for written in-
structions and 2.7 hours for oral instructions. Id.
200. See id. at 423 (stating that judges do not think that written instructions hurt
the jury’s ability to perform their duty.); see also Madge, supra note 178, at 822; Leo-
nard B. Sand & Steven Alan Reiss, A Report on Seven Experiments Conducted by Dis-
trict Court Judges in the Second Circuit, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 423, 453-56 (1985)
(discussing the effectiveness of written instructions for juries).
201. Heuer & Penrod, supra note 181, at 421.
202. Id. at 420. Jurors were asked six multiple choice questions aimed at testing
their comprehension and the mean correct scores were 6.7 for the written instructions
and 6.8 for the oral instructions. Id.
203. Id. at 429.
204. See Reifman, Gusick & Ellsworth, supra note 166, at 549 (noting that written
instructions did not improve the number of procedural or substantive law questions
asked by jurors).
205. Geoffrey P. Kramer & Dorean M. Koening, Do Jurors Understand Criminal
Jury Instructions? Analyzing the Results of the Michigan Juror Comprehension Project,
23 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 401, 428 (1990); see also Irene G. Prager, Gerard Deckelbaum
& Brian Cutler, Improving Juror Understanding for Intervening Causation Instruc-
tions, 3 FORENSIC REPORTS 187 (1989).  Prager, Deckelbaum & Cutlers’ article was cited
by Lieberman & Sales, supra note 169, at 627.
206. THOMAS, supra note 159, at 38.
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after the trial concluded,207 a limitation the researchers themselves
acknowledge.208  Compare this to Kramer and Koenig’s research,
where jurors were surveyed immediately after the conclusion of the
trial (and where improvements in comprehension were reported).
That said, the role that written instructions might play in improving
comprehension should not be over-stated.  Putting instructions in
writing cannot compensate for instructions that are inherently un-
clear.209  As Lieberman and Sales put it, “presenting participants
with written versions of unintelligible instructions cannot be expected
to be beneficial.  If a person does not speak a foreign language, it will
not matter if they are given written or verbal instructions in that for-
eign tongue.”210
There are some practical issues.  A copy of the written instruc-
tions should be given to each individual juror, otherwise there is a
danger that the person with the written instructions dominates the
discussion.211  There is the question of whether they should be pro-
vided before the oral instructions are given, or afterwards.  In favor of
the former, this enables jurors to follow them as the charge is being
given.212  In favor of the latter, there is the danger that the jury will
not focus sufficiently on what is being said if they are distracted by the
written copy.213  There is also the issue of juror literacy.  It cannot be
assumed that all jurors will have levels of literacy that would enable
them to read a written text, so provision needs to be made in this re-
spect by, for example, the use of recorded verbal or video instructions.
VII. CONCLUSION
The danger of wrongful conviction posed by mistaken eyewitness
identification is a very real one, with such evidence being identified as
the leading cause of wrongful conviction in the two major studies
based on DNA exoneration cases.  The need for measures to safeguard
against wrongful convictions caused by mistaken eyewitness identifi-
cation can scarcely be debated.  Where there lies more disagreement,
however, is in the most appropriate method of doing so.
207. Heuer & Penrod, supra note 181, at 417.  The questionnaires were sent out by
post after the conclusion of the trial. Id.
208. Id. at 423.  To this might be added the issue that the survey was by way of a
postal questionnaire to which the response rate was only sixty-nine percent. Id. at 418.
209. See Rose & Ogloff, supra note 157, at 427 (describing a conspiracy instruction
where there was no difference in comprehension between those jurors given the oral and
the written version).
210. Lieberman & Sales, supra note 169, at 628.
211. Forston, supra note 177, at 620.
212. Marder, supra note 155, at 499; NEW ZEALAND LAW COMMISSION, supra note
176, at ¶ 314.
213. Madge, supra note 178, at 821.
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Jury instructions warning jurors of the risks of misidentification
and alerting them to the factors relevant to evaluating eyewitness tes-
timony have often been dismissed as ineffective.  It has been demon-
strated here, however, that this conclusion is based on a misreading of
the relevant experimental evidence.  While all of the studies in this
area might purport to demonstrate ineffectiveness, they all have
methodological flaws.  A more informed reading of the studies (and the
evidence from related areas) suggests that jury instructions can be ef-
fective in educating jurors about the risks associated with eyewitness
identification evidence and in evaluating such evidence sensitively.  In
order to do so, however, they need: to be expressed in language that
jurors can understand; to accurately reflect the relevant scientific evi-
dence; to indicate to jurors why they are being given; and to be pro-
vided in writing (or in a suitable alterative form to those who have
literacy difficulties).
Two further concluding remarks are in order.  First, while the fo-
cus here has been specifically on the role of jury instructions, the con-
clusions reached in this regard should not be taken to suggest that
they are the only effective methods of protecting against wrongful con-
viction caused by mistaken eyewitness identification.  The important
role played during the initial investigation in ensuring that identifica-
tion procedures are conducted according to best practice guidelines
should not be neglected.214  Likewise, in addition to jury instructions,
there may also be an important role to be played at trial by exclusion-
ary powers and expert testimony.  These three measures should be
seen as complementary, not as alternatives.215  Exclusion may be ap-
propriate where identification evidence is so weak that no reasonable
jury could find it credible.216  Allowing expert testimony (whether via
a court appointed expert or by allowing both parties to lead their own
expert witnesses) may be appropriate to deal with special circum-
stances (for example where an eyewitness is a child or has a learning
disability) or where the findings of experimental research are con-
tested (for example in relation to the effect of stress on the accuracy of
identification).
Second, this analysis serves as a warning of the dangers of relying
on lawyers’ understanding of psychological research as a basis for pol-
icy formation.  There is a danger that the findings of mock jury re-
search are accepted uncritically and without due consideration of
what can actually be drawn from them, given the research methodol-
214. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
215. Dufraimont, supra note 6, at 325; Koosed, supra note 52, at 617.
216. Baxter, supra note 52, at 176.
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ogy concerned.  With some notable exceptions,217 the community of le-
gal scholars (and indeed some psychologists) has essentially coalesced
around a view about the ineffectiveness of jury instructions that was
not supported by a proper reading of the studies.  There are lessons for
lawyers and psychologists here.  While there is undoubtedly much
value to be learned about the design of legal processes from experi-
mental psychology, lawyers need to be informed about the potential
limitations of mock jury research and to evaluate critically the exter-
nal validity of studies before relying on them as the basis for policy
decisions.  At the same time, if psychologists wish to exert an influ-
ence outside their own discipline, there is a need to design experi-
ments that reflect legal reality as far as possible and to be sensitive to
what their findings imply for real trial processes.
217. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
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